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Abstract
This paper proposes an empirical method to estimate the value of  the neutral interest 
rate in the U.S. and investigates whether the non-conventional monetary policy that 
has been in effect since the 2008 recession should continue. Specifically, a procedure 
is established based on a Cointegrated Vector Autoregression (CVAR) model that en-
ables us to conclude that the expansionary monetary policy could continue for at least 
three more years. Our estimates suggest that the neutral real rate, consistent with full 
employment and the inflation target in the U.S., will remain negative until 2018. This 
trend will continue until 2019, when the nominal neutral rate will reach a level of  2%, 
which remains below the pre-crisis level of  4%. In fact, it seems that the neutral rate 
has permanently shifted toward a lower level associated with the new fundamentals of  
the U.S. economy.
Key words: Neutral interest rate, zero interest rate policy, CVAR model.
Classification JEL: E43, E51, E52.
Resumen
Este artículo propone un método empírico para estimar el valor de la tasa de interés 
neutral de Estados Unidos (EE.UU.) e investiga si la política monetaria no convencional 
que ha estado en vigor desde la recisión de 2008 debe continuar. Específicamente, se 
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establece un procedimiento basado en un modelo de vectores autorregresivos coin-
tegrado (CVAR) que nos permite concluir que la política monetaria expansiva podría 
continuar por lo menos tres años más. Nuestras estimaciones sugieren que la tasa real 
neutral, consistente con el pleno empleo y el objetivo de inflación de EE.UU., continuará 
siendo negativa hasta 2018. Esta tendencia continuará hasta 2019, cuando la tasa neu-
tral nominal alcanzará un nivel de 2%, la cual permanecerá por debajo del nivel previo 
a la crisis, 4%. De hecho, pareciera que la tasa neutral se ha desplazado hacia un nivel 
menor asociado con los nuevos fundamentos de la economía norteamericana.
Palabras clave: tasa de interés neutral, tasa de interés de política cero, modelo CVAR.
IћѡџќёѢѐѡіќћ
Can the U.S. Federal Reserve (FED) indefinitely maintain low interest rates to 
stimulate the economy? Is it possible to accurately predict when the FED could 
modify its monetary policy rate without adversely affecting the dynamics of  
the real economy? The answer to these questions is of  substantial importance 
because it is highly likely that in 2016, the FED will gradually increase its mon-
etary policy rate not only to fulfill its mandate to promote economic growth 
with price stability but also to recover its primary monetary policy instrument1. 
The economic literature suggests that a central bank should set its monetary 
policy rate at a level at which its average short-term rate equals the neutral in-
terest rate. The latter is the rate that is compatible with the potential output 
of  the economy and the target inflation rate of  a central bank. In theory, if  a 
central bank seeks to maintain its monetary policy rate below the neutral rate 
for a long period, the aggregate demand will exceed productive capacity and 
generate inflation. Thus, the value of  the neutral rate is an important param-
eter with respect to answering our two questions and to establishing the policy 
stance of  the monetary authorities. 
However, a fundamental problem is that the neutral interest rate is not 
observable and can change over time (Clarida, 2015). Consequently, it is of  
crucial importance for central banks to possess empirical methods that enable 
them to project the neutral interest rate to determine with greater certainty 
1  A press release from the FED (Yellen, 2015, 27th March) reported that the real equilibrium federal 
funds rate was below its historical average (4%). The release also stated that the normalization of  
the U.S. economy would be performed gradually as long as the prognosis of  the fundamentals of  the 
U.S. economy indicated that this approach was appropriate.   
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when it is possible to withdraw the monetary stimulus without the fear of  creat-
ing a new recession. In the international literature, various methods have been 
proposed to estimate this rate, from the use of  simple time-series models to 
highly complex approaches, such as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
models (Giammarioli and Valla, 2004; Barsky, Justiniano, and Melosi, 2014; 
Cúrdia et al., 2015). However, often, the estimates obtained using these meth-
ods have been imprecise and prone to specification errors (Pescatori and 
Turunen, 2015). 
In this context, this article’s objective is twofold. First, a multivariate meth-
od is proposed to approximate the long-term neutral interest rate based on 
a Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive (CVAR) model. Second, an estimate of  
the value of  the neutral interest rate for the U.S. economy is made using this 
method, and a brief  discussion is provided on the appropriateness of  the FED 
gradually increasing its monetary policy interest rate in the coming months. We 
believe that the result of  our estimation method is indicative of  and comple-
mentary to the estimates obtained with other models. Similarly, the proposed 
method can be a useful reference in analyzing the positions of  a central bank 
because it enables the determination of  how expansive the monetary policy 
should be in a context such as the current one. 
Specifically, to simulate the value of  the long-term neutral interest rate, we 
propose a simple method that is based on the identification of  an equation for 
the federal funds rate in the cointegrating space of  a CVAR model, which con-
tains the fundamental variables of  the real monetary sector of  an economy. 
Our results for the U.S. economy suggest that the nominal neutral rate in 2016 
will be approximately 0.56% and that the neutral real rate will be –0.89%. If  we 
compare our results with the nominal and real rates obtained with the Laubach-
Williams method2 (2003), we can observe that they are above the value of  our 
estimates. In addition, based on our model’s projections to 2021, we can sug-
gest that there remains a place for a longer period of  expansionary monetary 
policy in the U.S. Fundamentally, we conclude that the current position of  an 
interest rate close to zero could be extended without problems until the last 
quarter of  2018. If  the FED determines to gradually increase the rate starting 
in 2016, economic losses would be generated for the U.S. and countries whose 
economies are closely linked to that of  the U.S., such as Mexico.
2  In an estimates update of  Laubach and Williams (2003), the nominal neutral rate was 1.21% and the 
neutral real rate was –0.271% until the third quarter of  2015.
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This paper is structured as follows. The second section presents the frame-
work of  monetary theory that serves as the basis according to which we de-
termine our long-term neutral interest rate measurement. In the third section, 
the econometric method used to estimate the long-term neutral interest rate 
is described. The fourth section presents the model and the neutral interest 
rate. In the final section, possible implications for the U.S. economy are briefly 
discussed. 
 
Dђѡђџњіћюѡіќћ ќѓ ѡѕђ ћђѢѡџюљ іћѡђџђѠѡ џюѡђ 
The neutral interest rate (rt
* ) is defined as the short-term interest rate that is 
consistent with full employment and the inflation target of  a central bank. It has 
also been defined as that interest rate that would be established if  there was no 
nominal rigidity (Galí, 2002) in such a way that at any time the real equilibrium 
would be basically determined by the fundamentals of  the economy. Therefore, 
knowing the accurate value of  this rate is of  substantial importance for decision 
making by the monetary authority. The problem is that the long-term neutral 
rate is a non-observable variable, which complicates its estimation. In theory, 
its value can be approximated from the estimate of  a short-term interest rate 
equation that depends on the fundamental variables of  the economy (Taylor, 
1993). Thus, to estimate this rate for the U.S., the parameters of  the federal 
funds interest rate equation rt can be identified and estimated as a function of  
the fluctuations in the inflation gap (P P ) (i.e., the difference between observed 
inflation and the target inflation) and the output gap (y y ) (i.e., the difference 
between potential output and observed output).
r r y yt t t t t t    
* * *( ) ( )B P P Q [1]
which can also be expressed as follows:
r r y yt t t t t t    
* * *B P B P Q Q1 2 1 2 [1a]
If  B1 = B2 and Q1 = Q2, equation [1a] is equivalent to equation [1]. This formula-
tion suggests that the monetary policy rate rt should increase when inflation and 
the output level of  the economy are above the target inflation and the potential 
output, respectively, and it should decrease otherwise. There is an expanded 
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form of  the Taylor rule that incorporates inflation expectations: Pt
e
1. This 
model does not substantially differ from the original. The only difference is 
that the latter contains the neutral interest rate in real terms. 
r r y yt t t
e
t t t t     
* * *( ) ( )P B P P Q1 [2]
Theoretically, if  we can precisely estimate all of  the components of  equation 
[1], we can obtain the long-term nominal neutral interest rate through a simple 
algebraic manipulation as follows:
r r y yt t t t t t
* * *( ) ( )    B P P Q [3]
Based on this simple equation, we can define an empirical method to determine 
the value of  the nominal neutral interest rate. To this end, the identification and 
estimation of  equation [1] is proposed in a CVAR model, which provides the basis 
for the derivation of  the value of  the nominal neutral rate defined in equation 
[3]. In the following, we provided a more detailed explanation of  the previously 
mentioned econometric method. In addition, we compare our results with a 
more traditional method, which estimates a neutral rate that changes over time, 
as has been popularized by Laubach and Williams for more than a decade.
Eѐќћќњђѡџіѐ њђѡѕќё
In this section, we describe the econometric method used to empirically estimate 
the long-term nominal neutral interest rate in the U.S. economy. Fundamen-
tally, the proposed procedure consists of  identifying equation [1] in the error 
correction structure (long-term) of  a CVAR model. Importantly, this procedure, 
which is based on a multivariate model, helps avoid problems of  spuriousness 
when series are not stationary and the statistical biases that might arise from 
simultaneity problems, which are frequent in a single-equation estimate. Our 
model contains the fundamental variables proposed in equation [1], and its 
estimate enables us to infer not only the nominal neutral interest rate but also 
the neutral real rate.
In the presence of  variables with unit roots, the estimation and identification 
of  the long-term Taylor rule through a CVAR model can be performed in three 
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steps. The first step involves specifying and estimating a VAR that is statistically 
appropriate for the set of  variables that determine the monetary policy interest 
rate, rt. That is, the nominal interest rate of  the monetary policy, the real U.S. 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the potential GDP, inflation and inflation expec-
tations are incorporated as the determinants of  the rate. The estimate of  this 
model involves choosing the order of  lags of  the VAR, the cointegration rank, 
the type of  deterministic polynomial of  the model and a sensitive specification 
of  the space of  cointegration (Johansen, 1995, p. 74). 
In the second step, the VAR model is transformed into a CVAR model to iden-
tify the long-term specific association between the nominal interest rate of  the 
monetary policy and the inflation and output gaps. At this stage, the starting 
point is to estimate the CVAR model suggested in the following equation. Then, 
a series of  restrictions are imposed on the model’s long-term component:
'(L)$zt = M + AB’zt–1 + Et [4]
That is, once model [4] has been estimated, restrictions are imposed on its er-
ror correction structure (AB’zt–1) to seek the identification of  a cointegration 
relationship statistically significantly associated with equation [1], which can be 
estimated in the form of  the following cointegrating vector:
e r y yt t t t      1 1 1 2 1
* * *( ) ( )B B P P [5]
where (y – y*)t–1 is the output gap; (P – P*)t–1 is the inflation gap; et–1 is the error 
correction mechanism that represents policy rate, and rt
* is the non-observable 
long-term nominal neutral interest rate 
Equation [1] must be exactly identified or over-identified in the CVAR, and the 
economic restrictions imposed in the long-term component must be validated 
by means of  statistical evidence. Finally, the short- and medium-term valida-
tion of  the CVAR model is performed using the traditional diagnostic tests (see 
Statistical Appendix) and a plausible modeling of  the instantaneous correlations 
through the impulse response functions.
The third and final step in estimating the nominal neutral interest rate consists 
of  using the estimated long-term equation [5] to estimate the rate based on the 
difference of  the values of  the monetary policy interest rate et–1 and the values 
predicted by the long-term equation, as suggested by equation [6]:
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            [6]
That is, the long-term signal of  the non-observable neutral rate, rt
* , is extracted 
using the long-term equation identified and estimated by the CVAR model. This 
method is more appropriate than a single-equation model because it contains 
information on the dynamics and interactions between the involved variables.
Eњѝіџіѐюљ џђѠѢљѡѠ 
For the econometric analysis, a statistically appropriate VAR model was estimated 
using variables from the U.S. monetary sector for the period 2000-2015. The data 
are released quarterly, and the output series is used in its logarithmic form. The 
remaining series that were used are the nominal interest rate of  the monetary 
policy, the real U.S. GDP, the potential GDP estimated with the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter, inflation and expected inflation. The VAR model includes an unrestrictedt
constant and three lags. The tests for unit root and for correct individual and 
joint specification of  the model are shown in Tables 1a and 1b in the Statisti-
cal Appendix. The number of  lags was selected based on the diagnostic of  
the general model. However, other tests were also used, such as the Schwarz 
information criterion, the Godfrey portmanteau test and the Likelihood Ratio 
(LR) test (see Tables 1c and 1d in the Statistical Appendix). First, the cointe-
gration rank is analyzed based on Johansen’s reduced-rank method. The trace 
statistics suggest that there are at least four cointegrating vectors, as shown 
Table 1 (Johansen, 1988, p. 235). 
Table 1
Johansen’s test of cointegration rank (trace test)






Note: The cointegration test indicates at least four cointegrating vectors 
at a 95% confidence level. 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the ѐѣюџ model.
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To provide more evidence on the subject, Table 2 shows a sequential test, as 
described by Johansen (1995, chap. 11 and 12), for the joint determination of  
the cointegration rank and the polynomial trend3. Table 2 shows the testing for 
deterministic components with both the constant and the trend. 
Table 2
Johansen’s sequential test (1995, chap. 11 and 12) used 
for joint determination of the cointegration rank 
and the deterministic polynomial
Model type R Trace 99%
I(0) Intercept, I(1) None 0 384.87 76.07
I(0) Intercept, I(1) Intercept 0 423.07 84.45
I(0) Intercept, I(1) None 1 112.97 54.46
I(0) Intercept, I(1) Intercept 1 151.12 60.16
I(0) Intercept, I(1) None 2 47.62 35.65
I(0) Intercept, I(1) Intercept 2 51.23 41.07
I(0) Intercept, I(1) None 3 21.55 20.04
I(0) Intercept, I(1) Intercept 3 23.07 24.6
I(0) Intercept, I(1) None 4 0.73 6.65
I(0) Intercept, I(1) Intercept 4 0.86 12.97
Note: R = cointegration rank; None = the type of model estimated does 
not have a trend or a constant. 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the ѐѣюџ model.
The results suggest there are at least four cointegrating vectors at the 95% 
confidence level. The Johansen maximum likelihood method also enables us to 
identify the cointegration space. One treatment used to solve the problem of  
identification is to adopt a set of  a priori restrictions that are verifiable in the 
space of  the long-term parameters (AB’zt–1). In this case, we normalize the first 
cointegrating vector as a long-term equation of  the nominal interest rate of  
the monetary policy and then consider the hypothesis that the differences be-
tween the inflation and output gaps are stationary. That is, the coefficients of  
output and potential output are equal (B1 = B2) and the coefficients of  inflation 
and expected inflation are equal (Q1 = Q2) in equation [1a]. The results shown 
3  A good practice is to determine the rank and type of  deterministic polynomial because the statistical 
distribution of  the rank differs among the possible choices of  deterministic component in the model.
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in Table 3 suggest that these restrictions are statistically appropriate and en-
able a sensitive identification of  the error-correction structure of  the CVAR, as 
suggested by the over-identification test in the same table. That is, the data on 
the U.S. economy accept the restrictions associated with the Taylor rule. The 
normalized cointegrating vector is reported in the following as an equation of  
the federal funds rate. 
Table 3
First normalized cointegrating vector as an equation 
of the federal funds interest rate
e r y yt t t t        1 1 1 10 261211 1 143408 2 376954
* * *. ( ) . ( ) .P P [7]
Note: Over-identification test LR-CHISQR(2) = 0.514[0.473].
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the ѐѣюџ model. 
The long-term relationship in Table 3 indicates that it is possible to identify a 
function according to which the policy interest rate should increase when there 
are increases in the output and inflation gaps, as indicated by the previous em-
pirical models (Taylor, 1993; Clarida, 2015). More concretely, it is confirmed 
that the gaps have a permanent effect and transmit macroeconomic informa-
tion essential to the money market. The estimate of  equation [1] using the CVAR 
model reveals a decrease in the coefficient of  the output gap (0.26) and in the 
coefficient of  the inflation gap (1.14) compared with the original coefficients 
of  the Taylor rule (0.5 and 1.5, respectively) (Taylor, 1993; Clarida, 2015). The 
preceding discussion suggests that the long-term neutral interest rate has prob-
ably decreased as a result of  significant changes in the fundamentals of  the U.S. 
economy in recent years. 
DіѠѐѢѠѠіќћ
In this section, we provide the estimate of  the nominal neutral interest rate 
and the neutral real rate for the U.S. economy during the period 2000-2015 and 
their projections up to 2021. To this end, we use the cointegrating vector es-
timated through the CVAR in equation [7]. The neutral real rate is obtained by 
subtracting the inflation expectations that are obtained through an order-four 
autoregressive model of  the inflation from the CVAR-projected nominal neutral 
rate. Table 4 shows our annual average projections of  both rates and the estimate 
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made by Williams (2015) to provide a reference parameter for the discussion of  
the relevance of  the FED starting a new period of  interest rate increase (Clarida, 
2015; Clark and Kozicki, 2005).
Table 4
Neutral interest rate ( rt
*) through diﬀerent methods






















2000-2007 3.432 2.371 3.799 1.498 0.470 1.898








Note: */ Two-sided estimate by Laubach and Williams (2003). In addition, Pt
e
1  is the ex-
pected inflation.
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the ѐѣюџ model. 
The neutral nominal rate estimated with our model reached a level of  approxi-
mately 0.51 basis points (bps) in the period 2008-2015, whereas the neutral 
real rate was negative (approximately –1.033). If  we compare this result with 
the neutral real rate results obtained with classical methods4, such as Laubach 
and Williams (2003), we can observe that the results from our model coincide 
in direction but not in magnitude. In fact, our results are lower than the clas-
sical method results. The preceding suggests that according to our model the 
fundamentals of  the U.S. economy in 2015 indicated that there was still a need 
to maintain an expansive policy. It is well known that in 2015, the FED decided 
for the first time in nearly seven years to increase this rate to a range of  0.25 
to 0.50%. Our results and the most recent economic results seem to confirm 
4  Clarida (2015) uses the neutral interest rate estimated by Laubach and Williams in conjunction 
with the parameter suggested by the Taylor rule to interpret and assess the FED’s monetary policy 
during the period 2000-2017.
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that there is a full economic recovery and that the FED should defer a little lon-
ger the decision to increase its monetary policy rate. Thus, the CVAR estimates 
constitute a useful tool that can be used as reference to assess the positions of  
the central bank. 
In addition, based on our model’s projections for up to 2021, we can con-
firm that room remains for a longer period of  expansive monetary policy in 
the U.S. (Pescatori and Turunen, 2015). Fundamentally, we can conclude that the 
current position of  an interest rate close to zero could be extended without 
problems until the last quarter of  2018 (see Graph 1).
Graph 1
Projections of the nominal rate and neutral real rate 










2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  
Neutral real rate
Nominal neutral rate
Taylor rule assumption  
 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on the prognosis of the ѐѣюџ model. 
If  the FED determines to gradually increase the rate starting in 2016, economic 
losses would be generated for the U.S. and countries whose economies are closely 
linked to the U.S. economy. In fact, according to our projections, the neutral 
real rate will remain negative until 2019, which means that the economy will con-
tinue to experience inflation below the 2% target and that unemployment will 
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remain above the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of  Unemployment (NAIRU) 
(Clarida, 2015). In addition, the graph shows that despite the neutral nominal 
rate reaching a value between 2 and 3% after 2019, the rate would still be below 
the 4% estimated in the literature for the period prior to the 2008 crisis. This 
fact might indicate that the U.S. economy has undergone a structural change 
in its output potential and that the new neutral nominal rate associated with it 
is now substantially lower than the previously estimated 4%. Additionally, the 
neutral nominal rate is positive but very low in 2020, which indicates a need 
for the monetary stimulus not to be aggressively reduced because this action 
could result in a contraction with low inflation. Among other reasons for this 
outcome are that in the coming months, the GDP will likely be lower than the 
potential GDP and credit growth will also be very low (Bernanke, 2005; Clarida, 
2004; Clarida, 2015; Hamilton et al., 2015). 
It seems that although a massive monetary policy intervention to boost the 
economy in the manner of  the 2008 intervention is not required (Summers, 
2014), the conditions do not exist for an aggressive increase in the FED bonds 
interest rate because the estimated figures suggest that the monetary stimulus 
should continue for at least three years if  the economy is to resume sustained 
growth with an inflation within goal. However, as noted by Clarida (2015), it 
is likely that the FED will start an aggressive program of  monetary contraction 
once the economy achieves the NAIRU. However, too much anticipation could 
result in a contraction in the U.S. and closely linked economies, such as that 
of  Mexico. 
CќћѐљѢѠіќћѠ
This article proposed a multivariate method to approximate the value of  the 
long-term neutral interest rate based on a CVAR model. The results of  our estima-
tion method are only indicative. However, they may serve as a useful reference 
in assessing the positions of  a central bank because they offer evidence of  how 
expansive the monetary policy should be over time based on projections of  the 
neutral nominal and neutral real rates. Our model projects a negative neutral real 
interest rate until the last quarter of  2018, which is substantially lower than the 
estimates reported in recent documents. The preceding discussion suggests that 
the U.S. economy will experience below-target inflation with an unemployment 
rate above the NAIRU for at least two more years. Thus, there is a need for the 
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FED not to increase its reference interest rate in the coming months to avoid 
creating an economic contraction with low inflation. Generally, our empirical 
evidence suggests that a low neutral rate (approximately 2%) will continue until 
2021, which means that this rate will not return to pre-crisis levels for a long 
time. In fact, it seems that the neutral rate has permanently changed to a lower 
level associated with the new fundamentals of  the U.S. economy. 
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Aѝѝђћёіѥ
Table 1a
Unit root tests (January 2000-April 2015)
(Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests)
Variable
Model
Intercept Trend and intercept None
I –2.4138 –2.8980 –2.2154
LOG(YR)*100 –0.8116 –1.6816 3.1846
LOG(YP)*100 - - -
INFL2*100 –2.4687 –2.6797 –0.2511
INFLE2*100 –2.0104 –2.2992 –0.2286
ΔI –3.3875 –3.3938 –3.3426
ΔLOG(YR)*100 –5.8133 –5.7736 –3.1283
ΔLOG(YP)*100 –1.7353 –1.2350 –0.6716
ΔINFL2*100 –6.7323 –6.8474 –6.7892
ΔINFLE2*100 –7.1334 –7.2279 –7.1925
Note: The first diﬀerence of the series is indicated by Δ. The level of signifi-
cance 5%.
Table 1b





Note: * Significance level at 5%. ** Significance level at 10%.
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Table 1c
Akaike and Schwarz criteria




Lags Q-Statisctic Probability Df
1 21.7269 NA* NA*
2 51.1396 NA* NA*
3 74.6712 NA* NA*
4 96.4540 0.0000 39
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Comentarios al documento “Should the U.S. Federal 
Reserve increase the federal funds rate in 2016? 
An assessment based on the neutral interest rate”
por Jessica Roldán Peña, Julio A. Carrillo y Rocío Elizondoa
Iњѝќџѡюћѐію ёђ љю ѡюѠю ёђ іћѡђџѼѠ ћђѢѡџюљ 
Ѧ ѕюљљюѧєќѠ ёђљ ёќѐѢњђћѡќ ѐќњђћѡюёќ
De manera general, la tasa de interés neutral se define como aquella tasa de in- 
terés de corto plazo que prevalecería en la economía si esta se encontrara ope-
rando en su nivel potencial. De aquí que comparar el nivel de ésta con el nivel 
de la tasa de referencia establecida por un banco central sea fundamental para 
identificar la postura de política monetaria. Así, por un lado, si la tasa de referen-
cia se encuentra por encima del nivel neutral, la política monetaria es restrictiva, 
ya que los distintos canales del mecanismo de transmisión de la política mone-
a  Los autores pertenecen a la Dirección General de Investigación Económica del Banco de México. Los 
comentarios expresados aquí, así como las conclusiones que de ellos se derivan, son responsabilidad 
exclusiva de los autores y no reflejan necesariamente la opinión del Banco de México.
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taria operan en el sentido de restringir el ritmo de crecimiento de la demanda 
agregada (con el fin de mitigar las presiones inflacionarias). Por otro lado, si la 
tasa de referencia se encuentra por debajo de dicho nivel, la postura de polí- 
tica monetaria es acomodaticia y, a su vez, el mecanismo de transmisión mo-
netario estimula la demanda agregada. 
No obstante su relevancia, la tasa neutral es un concepto predominantemente 
teórico y, por ende, no observable ―su determinación requiere, en principio, 
conocer el estado de la economía en su nivel potencial en cada momento del 
tiempo―, lo que hace de su estimación una tarea difícil. Una complejidad adi-
cional para su determinación es que la tasa neutral no es constante, sino que 
puede variar debido a cambios en factores económicos, que pueden ser poco 
o muy persistentes, o incluso permanentes.
En este contexto, y dado el proceso de normalización de la política monetaria 
que la Reserva Federal de Estados Unidos ha comenzado a llevar a cabo, luego 
de que a raíz de la crisis financiera global de 2008-2009 ésta redujera su tasa de 
referencia hasta alcanzar niveles de prácticamente cero por ciento ―nivel en el 
cual permaneció durante siete años―, el análisis presentado en “Should the U.S. 
Federal Reserve increase the federal funds rate in 2016? An assessment based 
on the neutral interest rate”, de Armando Sánchez-Vargas, resulta oportuno y 
relevante.
A grandes rasgos, el artículo puede dividirse en dos partes. En la primera, el 
autor propone un método empírico para estimar la tasa neutral de la economía 
estadounidense. Con base en los resultados de esta estimación, en la segunda parte 
realiza un diagnóstico sobre la conveniencia de que la Reserva Federal incremente 
la tasa de Fondos Federales, i.e. su tasa de referencia, en los próximos años. 
Primero, el autor estima la tasa de interés neutral de Estados Unidos me-
diante el método de vectores autorregresivos cointegrados (CVAR en inglés), que 
consiste en establecer una relación de largo plazo entre la tasa de interés neutral 
respecto a la tasa de interés nominal, la brecha de la inflación y la brecha del 
producto. Para ello, se realiza la estimación en tres pasos: 1) se estima un VAR de 
orden tres para el conjunto de variables que determinan la política monetaria 
(inflación, expectativas de inflación, producto, producto potencial y la tasa de 
Fondos Federales); 2) el VAR se transforma en un CVAR, es decir, se imponen 
ciertas restricciones en la relación de largo plazo respecto a la brecha de inflación 
y la brecha del producto de tal forma que su estructura se asimila a una regla de 
Taylor y, de esta forma, obtener un vector de corrección de error, y 3) se estima 
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la tasa de interés neutral de largo plazo utilizando el vector de corrección de 
error. De la estimación del CVAR, el autor encuentra que los coeficientes de la 
brecha de inflación y del producto disminuyeron en comparación con aquellos 
de la regla de Taylor (Taylor, 1993), lo que lleva al autor a concluir que hubo un 
cambio significativo en los fundamentales de la economía estadounidense en 
años recientes, traduciéndose esto en una disminución de la tasa de interés 
neutral.
Posteriormente, utilizando el vector de corrección de error estimado me-
diante el CVAR descrito anteriormente, el autor proyecta la tasa de interés neutral 
hasta 2021. Los resultados de este ejercicio apuntan a que tanto la tasa de interés 
neutral real como la nominal se incrementarán gradualmente (lo que, implícita-
mente, supone que la inflación se acercará paulatinamente a su objetivo de 2%). 
En particular, la tasa de interés neutral real permanecerá negativa hasta 2017, 
para luego incrementarse hasta 0.34% en 2021; en tanto que su contraparte 
nominal aumentará de 0.56% en 2016 a 2.12% en 2021.
Los resultados anteriores llevan al autor a concluir que el hecho de que la tasa 
neutral nominal sea positiva pero muy baja “indica la necesidad de que el estí-
mulo monetario [prevaleciente en la economía estadounidense] no sea reducido 
agresivamente, dado que esta acción podría resultar en una contracción [econó-
mica] con baja inflación”.1 Asimismo, el autor señala que existe evidencia para 
suponer que la tasa neutral de interés no regresará al nivel que tenía antes de 
la crisis por un periodo largo de tiempo y que, incluso, parecería que su nivel ha 
cambiado permanentemente a uno menor.
DіѠѐѢѠіңћ
Como ya se mencionó, el tema de este documento resulta oportuno y relevante, 
a tal grado que, recientemente, la propia Reserva Federal ha divulgado los resul-
tados de sus propios estudios sobre el tema en diversas publicaciones.2 Por ello, 
es de suma importancia que el autor realice un esfuerzo adicional para comunicar 
de manera clara y detallada los principales puntos de su análisis y los argumentos 
1  Véase la quinta sección, p. 16.
2  Véanse las Minutas del Federal Open Market Commmittee, órgano colegiado encargado de la toma 
de decisiones de política monetaria en Estados Unido, correspondientes a la reunión de política 
monetaria del 27 y 28 de octubre de 2015 y el Reporte de Política Monetaria publicada por la Junta 
de Gobierno de la Reserva Federal en febrero de 2016.
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que lo llevan a las conclusiones que plantea. En este sentido, a continuación se 
mencionan algunas recomendaciones que podrían ser de utilidad.
Recomendaciones para el ejercicio econométrico
Sería deseable que el autor describiera con mayor detalle el ejercicio economé-
trico. Por un lado, no queda claro qué variables se usaron en la estimación del 
modelo VAR y el CVAR. Por ejemplo, el autor deja entrever que usará las variables 
descritas en la regla de Taylor, ecuación [1] del documento, que suman tres: 
la tasa de interés nominal de corto plazo de los Fondos Federales, la brecha del 
producto y la brecha de inflación de Estados Unidos (por cierto, habría que 
precisar la tasa de inflación a la que se refiere, e.g. la general, subyacente, la del 
consumidor o la de gastos del consumo; esta última es la que utiliza la Reserva 
Federal en sus reportes de inflación). Sin embargo, en la cuarta sección se dice 
que las pruebas de cointegración arrojan la existencia de cuatro relaciones de 
cointegración, un número mayor que el de las variables consideradas en la regla 
de Taylor. Una posibilidad es que el autor haya descompuesto las brechas del 
producto y de la inflación en sus componentes, es decir en el producto interno 
bruto (PIB) real y potencial, y en la inflación observada y la meta de inflación de 
la Reserva Federal o la inflación de equilibrio de largo plazo de Estados Unidos 
(conocida técnicamente como inflación tendencial o trend inflation, en inglés). 
Aún si este fuera el caso, sería conveniente que se reportaran más especifica-
ciones y pruebas sobre las variables consideradas. Por ejemplo, ¿qué variables 
aproximan mejor el producto potencial y la inflación de largo plazo? ¿Por qué 
no usar el PIB potencial de la US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) en lugar del 
filtro de Hodrick-Prescott, o la inflación tendencial que resulta de un modelo 
econométrico (véase Cogley, Primiceri y Sargent, 2010) o la que resulta de las 
expectativas de inflación de largo plazo? Después de contestar estas preguntas, 
lo natural sería presentar evidencia de la robustez de los resultados al conside-
rar diferentes aproximaciones. Realizar estas precisiones es importante no sólo 
para reconfortar al lector sobre la solidez de los resultados, sino para permitir 
a otros investigadores replicar las estimaciones del autor en otros estudios. En 
este contexto, es también importante reportar la fuente de donde se obtuvo la 
información de las variables utilizadas en la estimación.
Otra duda importante sobre las estimaciones es que, a pesar de que los resul-
tados sugieren la existencia de diferentes relaciones de cointegración, el autor 
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decide utilizar solamente una. Sería conveniente discutir por qué las otras re-
laciones no ofrecen información que pueda aprovecharse para estimar la tasa 
de interés neutral.
Por último, otra precisión recomendada es la de aclarar el grado de incer-
tidumbre de las estimaciones. Por ejemplo, en los cuadros 3 y 4 no se ofrece 
información acerca de los intervalos de confianza de los resultados ni de las 
desviaciones estándar de los coeficientes estimados. Este tipo de información 
no debería de faltar en un trabajo empírico.
Recomendaciones para la interpretación de los resultados
Es necesario esclarecer los supuestos sobre la evolución futura de la economía 
estadounidense en los cuales se basa la proyección de la tasa de interés neutral 
presentada en el cuadro 4. Por ejemplo, ¿los pronósticos de la tasa neutral se 
realizaron tomando como base los pronósticos dinámicos del propio CVAR sin 
considerar ningún insumo externo, o se complementó el CVAR con este tipo 
de insumos? En lo particular, en la quinta sección se dice que para calcular la 
tasa neutral real se usa el pronóstico para la inflación que resulta de un modelo 
autorregresivo de orden 4. Surge la duda de si para el resto del pronóstico se 
usan otros insumos para simular el PIB real y potencial en el futuro, o la inflación 
de equilibrio de largo plazo.
Ante lo anterior, resultaría interesante que el autor contrastara sus resultados, 
tanto de la trayectoria futura de la economía, del PIB y de la inflación como de la 
tasa de interés neutral que de ella se derivan, con los pronósticos para la actividad 
económica publicados cada trimestre por la Reserva Federal y otros analistas 
económicos. De este modo, constaría si las discrepancias entre los resultados 
derivados de este análisis y lo establecido en otros estudios se deben a diferen- 
cias metodológicas o, por el contrario, a diferencias en los supuestos utilizados.
Asimismo, sería recomendable comparar los resultados derivados del mo-
delo estimado no sólo con el modelo propuesto por Laubach y Williams (cuya 
noción de tasa de interés neutral se refiere a una que prevalecerá en el mediano 
plazo, condicionada a los factores estructurales, como el crecimiento poten-
cial, que el modelo captura en determinado periodo del tiempo), sino también 
a modelos con medidas de más corto plazo, como los modelos de equilibrio 
general dinámicos estocásticos (DSGE en inglés). Yellen (2015) ofrece una com-
paración entre los DSGEs y el modelo de Laubach y Williams, y sería interesante 
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comparar estas estimaciones con las del autor. Esto es de particular relevancia 
ante el número de publicaciones de corte académico que han surgido al respecto 
en los últimos años.3
Como complemento al punto anterior, destaca que el autor pueda calcular 
un nivel para la tasa neutral para cada periodo del tiempo durante el periodo 
de análisis, como se infiere de la ecuación [5]. Sería pues relevante mostrar la 
trayectoria de esta variable a lo largo del periodo de estimación e interpretar 
los resultados. Por ejemplo, muchos estudios sobre la tasa neutral en Estados 
Unidos concuerdan en que ésta disminuyó de forma considerable a partir de la 
gran crisis financiera global, y no ha vuelto a niveles precrisis desde entonces. 
Esta misma conclusión se hace en este artículo, por lo cual es relevante presentar 
la trayectoria de la tasa neutral estimada por el autor.
El siguiente punto de nuestra discusión se centra en la siguiente conclusión 
del autor “[…] basados en nuestras proyecciones del modelo hasta 2021, po-
demos confirmar que existe espacio para un periodo largo de política mone-
taria expansiva en Estados Unidos”.4 Una conclusión similar se muestra en el 
resumen del artículo, cuando se afirma que “[…] la política monetaria expansiva 
podría continuar por al menos tres años más.” Dado que la tasa neutral es el 
nivel crítico que identifica si la política monetaria es acomodaticia o restrictiva, 
la conclusión del autor sugiere que la tasa de Fondos Federales ha estado por 
debajo de su nivel neutral en los últimos años, y que así puede continuar en el 
futuro. Sin embargo, esta conclusión no está respaldada por los datos. Como 
es de todos sabido, la crisis financiera global generó una brecha del producto 
negativa en Estados Unidos que, hasta el día de hoy, no muestra señales claras 
de haberse cerrado. Esto implica que la tasa neutral debió haber caído más 
que la tasa de política monetaria como consecuencia de la crisis. De hecho, si 
la tasa de Fondos Federales hubiera disminuido tanto como la tasa neutral, la 
brecha del producto hubiera permanecido cerrada (véase Cúrdia et al., 2015). Sin 
embargo, la tasa de política monetaria no pudo disminuir lo suficiente debido 
a su cota inferior de cero. Esto implicó que, en los primeros años de la crisis 
financiera, la política monetaria de la Reserva Federal haya sido restrictiva a 
pesar de haber fijado su tasa de referencia en su nivel mínimo desde la Gran 
Depresión. En consecuencia, la Reserva Federal optó por proveer una mayor 
3  Véanse, por ejemplo, Barsky, Justiniano y Melosi (2014); Cúrdia et al. (2015); Hamilton et al. (2015); 
Kiley, 2015; Del Negro et al. (2015); Lubik y Mathes (2015), y Johannsen y Mertens (2016), entre otros. 
4  Véase la quinta sección, p. 15; las cursivas son nuestras.
 Should the U.S. Federal Reserve increase the federal funds rate in 2016?        25
estimulación monetaria a través de políticas no convencionales, dado que no le 
era posible disminuir más su tasa de referencia. 
Este episodio demuestra que, para juzgar si una política monetaria es ex-
pansiva o restrictiva, es necesario evaluar la diferencia entre la tasa de interés de 
referencia respecto al nivel actual de la tasa neutral. No se puede, por tanto, iden-
tificar la postura de política monetaria a través del nivel de la tasa neutral o de la 
tasa de referencia en aislamiento; se necesita de las dos tasas. Por consiguiente, 
el autor no muestra evidencia de que la política monetaria de la Reserva Federal 
será expansiva en los años venideros, sino sólo que la tasa neutral presenta se-
ñales de recuperación. Así, si la tasa de referencia aumentara más rápidamente 
que la tasa neutral, entonces la economía estadounidense experimentaría costos 
debido a una postura monetaria restrictiva. Creemos que este cambio sutil en 
las conclusiones es de vital importancia para entender el papel que juega la tasa 
de interés neutral en la conducción de la política monetaria de un banco central. 
Al respecto, una posible guía para el autor sería considerar los argumentos del 
más reciente discurso de Yellen (2016), en el que señala que la tasa de Fondos 
Federales real se encuentra modestamente por debajo de la tasa real neutral 
(cercana a cero por ciento), y que la orientación de la política monetaria en la 
actualidad debe ser vista como modestamente acomodaticia. Asimismo, menciona 
que si las perspectivas económicas continúan evolucionando favorablemente 
esto significaría que la tasa de interés neutral de la misma se moverá hacia arriba, 
proporcionando así un nuevo impulso para aumentar gradualmente la tasa de 
Fondos Federales.
Finalmente, se considera importante que el autor ponga en contexto las conclu-
siones de su análisis en el siguiente sentido. Los que suscriben, no encontramos 
referencia alguna en Clarida (2015) sobre la previsión de que la Reserva Federal 
iniciará un programa de contracción monetaria agresiva una vez que la economía 
alcance la NAIRU. De hecho, en las conclusiones del referido artículo, Clarida 
señala que el dicho Banco Central ha indicado que planea incrementar su tasa de 
interés a un paso mesurado (pp. 105-106). Idea que, en efecto, la Reserva Federal 
ha confirmado en repetidas ocasiones (véase Yellen, 2016). 
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The Fed’s path to normalcy and the puzzling natural rate
of interest: A comment on Armando Sánchez’s paper
by Ignacio Perrotini Hernándeza
It seems safe to say that, prior to December 2008, the Federal Reserve (Fed) 
of  the United States (U.S.) used to conduct its monetary policy in a somewhat 
simple manner throughout the business cycle: the Fed would increase short-
term interest rates ―in particular, the federal funds rate (rf) and the primary 
credit rate, the Fed’s primary monetary policy tools― to avert inflation during 
an upswing and, conversely, it would reduce them to spur the economy when 
a recession came about. Such scheme has recently been christened as conven-
tional monetary policy (cf. Bernanke, 2013). Yet, both the Great Recession that 
began in December 2007 and the disappointingly slow recovery that ensued, 
pushed the federal funds rate down the so-called zero lower bound, which is 
the lower limit on nominal interest rates (Keister, 2011). These events paved the 
way for monetary policy to become more convoluted in character.
Indeed, on December 16th 2008 a range was set for the target rf of  0% to 
0.25% by the Federal Open Market committee (FOMC). That meant also “the 
end of  orthodoxy”, according to former Fed chairman Ben Bernanke (2015, 
p. 418), as conventional monetary policy was worn out. The Fed could not re-
duce the rf any further. But in 2009 the U.S. economy was still confronting the 
toughest recession ever since the Great Depression of  the 1930s. So, to pro-
vide further boost to economic recovery, and achieve its dual mandate of  
maximum sustainable employment and price stability, the Fed “turned to less 
conventional monetary policy” (Bernanke, 2013, p. 102). The tools of  the 
new unconventional monetary policy include (i) balance sheet policies through 
large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs), also known as quantitative easing (i.e. mas-
sive purchases of  long-term treasuries and agency-backed MBS (mortgage-
backed securities)), (ii) operation twist (replacement of  short-term Treasuries 
with longer-term Treasuries), and (iii) an increasing forward guidance thor-
oughly stating the FOMC’s future policy initiatives. The Fed’s unconventional 
monetary policy is mainly geared at putting downward pressure on a broad ar-
ray of  market interest rates by means of  increasing excess reserves, the portfo-
a  Professor of  Monetary Theory and Policy, The Graduate Faculty of  the School of  Economics, 
UNAM. Correspondence: iph@unam.mx.
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lio channel and the ex ante announcement of  future low policy rates. Likewise, 
the Fed’s accommodative stance seeks to ease credit conditions1 and bolster the 
economic recovery.
While it has been argued that the unconventional monetary policy will be 
ditched as the economy returns to normalcy, in the intervening time its end 
result has been: (i) a more than fourfold increase in total assets held by the Fed 
(from $891 billion in December 2007 to a record of  $4,476 trillion for the week 
ending 14 January 20152) (see Figure 1); (ii) an unprecedented long-period of  
low interest rate targets, in particular a low federal funds rate, a situation which 
is sometimes dubbed an interest rate trap, and (iii) by no means less impor-
tantly, an impassioned debate on both the exit ways available to the Fed and 
the future of  the federal funds interest rate. 
Figure 1
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Source: FRED Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Available 
through: <hĴps://research.stlouisfed.org/>.
1  Small wonder Ben Bernanke prefers the term “credit easing” rather than “quantitative easing” (see 
Bernanke, 2013 and 2015). 
2  On October 2014 the FOMC decided to wrap up its LSAPs program; the Fed’s balance sheet has been 
trending marginally down ever since. Yet, Fed’s balance sheet still was $4,423 trillion on June 8th, 
2016.
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Armando Sánchez’s paper contributes to this important debate in various 
respects which, due to both space and time constraints, we cannot discuss at 
length. My comments, then, fall into three categories. First, I briefly lay out some 
theoretical issues about the neutral or natural rate of  interest which are rel-
evant to the paper’s main subject matter, but, alas, not dealt with therein. Sec-
ond, a summary of  the paper follows highlighting a few topics that seemingly 
merit further discussion. Finally, I come to the analysis of  the author’s policy 
conclusion.
Tѕђ WіѐјѠђљљіюћ ѐќћћђѐѡіќћ 
юћё ѡѕђ ѡѕђќџѦ ќѓ ѡѕђ ћюѡѢџюљ іћѡђџђѠѡ џюѡђ
The neutral interest rate is the cornerstone of  Armando Sánchez’s paper. Knut 
Wicksell, who pioneered the theory of  the rate of  interest “which is neutral 
in respect to commodity prices, and tends neither to raise nor to lower them”, 
explained it as “the current value of  the natural rate of  interest on capital” (1965 
[1898], p. 102; author’s emphasis). Wicksell’s interest-rate mechanism establishes 
the connection between the endogenous money supply and the supply and 
demand for credit, as well as the coordination of  saving and investment. 
It has been argued that the monetary system of  various economies currently 
bear a strong resemblance to the Wicksellian mechanism of  interest rates (see 
Woodford, 2003). While in Wicksell’s model of  a “pure credit economy” the 
capital rate is the centre of  gravity of  both prices and market interest rates, 
he envisaged basic information and coordination troubles with regard the de-
terminants of  the natural or neutral rate of  interest on capital. Coordination 
failures of  interest rates and saving and investment give rise to cumulative 
effects (inflationary effects when the market rate is lower than the capital rate 
and contractionary ones in the reverse case). Furthermore, it is important to 
bear in mind that Wicksell thought of  his pure credit economy as an abstract con-
struct or, to use David Laidler’s expression, as an analytic fiction, one in which 
the natural or neutral rate is determined by real factors alone. Wicksell hardly 
treated his pure credit economy as a mirror image of  a real-world monetary 
economy; nor he treats it as Woodford’s moneyless economy in which the 
supply and demand for money plays no role whatsoever in the transmission 
mechanism of  monetary policy. Moreover, even today’s U.S. monetary system 
hardly works as Wicksell would have it in his theoretical abstraction.
30        Armando Sánchez Vargas
Today’s U.S. economy’s neutral rate, Armando Sánchez maintains, has per-
manently declined (about 2%), and “will not return to pre-crisis levels for a long 
time”. Such self-assured avowal, I surmise, suitably derived from Armando’s 
CVAR model, begs the question of  the causes which determine the neutral or nat-
ural rate of  interest (cf. Wicksell, 1965 [1898]), a puzzle that the Swedish high-
brow economist painstakingly endeavoured to unravel theoretically in his no-
table piece of  excavation Interest and Prices: keeping the average level of  money 
prices constant “is to be regarded as the fundamental problem of  monetary 
science” (Wicksell, 1907, p. 219). Yet, Wicksell’s solution to the natural rate 
conundrum hinges upon a number of  convoluted assumptions. Since Armando 
Sánchez’s paper is meant for the present journal’s section called “for the sci-
entific debate”, some theoretical discussion of  the precedent issue would have 
been appropriate to supplement Armando Sánchez’s original empirical analysis 
of  an economy ―i.e., that of  the United States― facing a liquidity trap, stagna-
tion, the zero lower bound, risks of  (Wicksellian) cumulative effects and, most 
importantly, the imperative challenge of  a return to normalcy. 
Tќ ѕіјђ ќџ ћќѡ ѡќ ѕіјђ џюѡђѠӓ
Armando Sánchez’s purpose, in this paper, is to empirically gauge, with the 
aid of  a multivariate method, the long-term value of  the Fed’s neutral interest 
rate which is consistent with full employment and price stability. His results, 
derived from a cointegrated vector autoregressive model, lead him to delve 
into the rather complex question whether it would be reasonable for the U.S. 
Fed to increase its policy rate (the if) any time during 2016-2018. 
Some commentators have argued that the Federal Reserve is fuelling the 
next inflation (cf. Meltzer, 2014), and would like to see drastic rate hikes, and, 
for that matter, the Fed going back to a monetary policy system akin to that of  
the Great Moderation period, when inflation declined faster than both the if 
and the 10-year bond yield, except for the sub-period 2002-2005 in the case of  
the if when the Fed eased monetary policy to fight the dot-com recession (see 
Figure 2). However, clearly the long-run bond rate outgrew the federal funds 
rate for most of  the Great Moderation period, until they converged on the eve 
of  the outbreak of  the Great Recession in 2007. 
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Figure 2
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Source: FRED Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Available 
through: <hĴps://research.stlouisfed.org/>.
It seems that Armando Sánchez’s empirical analysis does not support such a U-
haul which would imply a return to the Great moderation era. In this regard, 
his most amazing findings are: (i) a seemingly permanent lower long-term neu-
tral interest rate, compared to the pre-Great Recession level; (ii) a lower nominal 
neutral rate in 2016 (and even beyond 2020), also compared to the 4% level 
observed before the crisis; (iii) a negative neutral real interest rate between 2016 
(–0.899) and the beginning of  2018 (0.054), along with inflation rates below 
the inflation target (2%) and high unemployment rates; (iv) all these empirical 
results are indicative of  the U.S. economy undergoing deep changes in its fun-
damentals in the last decades. Therefore, Armando Sánchez concludes, there is 
policy space for monetary stimulus consistent with price stability, and the Fed 
should keep its current policy stance “for at least three [more] years if  the econ-
omy is to resume sustained growth with inflation within goal”. Thus, it turns 
out that the Fed should stand still on the if, otherwise deflation with output 
contraction would ensue. As it were, our author here appears to advocate a con-
tinuance of  the zero interest rate policy (ZIRP), which makes an interest rate sce-
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nario similar to that of  the post-Great Recession or quantitative easing period 
(see Figure 3), where the Fed systematically has kept if below the inflation rate 
target to support economic recovery.
Figure 3
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Source: FRED Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Available 
through: <hĴps://research.stlouisfed.org/>.
Other authors from different theoretical persuasions have also recommended 
the Fed should not engage in rate hikes for the time being (see Borg, 2015). 
Moreover, it seems ―at least to the present commentator― that Armando 
Sánchez´s main tenet of  a permanent lower long-term neutral interest rate 
implies the Fed should adopt unconventional monetary policy as the new nor-
mal, a suggestion already made in another context by Posen (2013), Krugman 
(2015) and Summers (2015), among other New Keynesian analysts. Yet, this 
standstill position raises the questions of  the potential risks, tradeoffs and 
costs associated with a zero lower bound and negative interest rates. 
On the whole, what seems to be out of  the question is that the policy nor-
malization of  the Fed will not entertain a return to a state of  affairs of  volatile 
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interest rates and rampant inflation similar to the pre-Volcker era (see Figure 4), 
where, for reasons opposite to the ZIRP scenario, the Fed lost control of  its 
policy tool.
Figure 4
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Source: FRED Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Available 
through: <hĴps://research.stlouisfed.org/>.
Tѕђ ѝюѡѕ ѡќ ћќџњюљіѧюѡіќћ
 
Armando Sánchez’s paper raises two important queries (whether the Fed can 
indefinitely carry on its zero interest rate policy and whether the appropriate 
time for a benign “litoff ” can be predicted). These inquiries belong to a Wick-
sellian tradition dealing with the influence of  the rate of  interest on prices 
and business fluctuations (see Wicksell, 1965 [1898]; Lindhal, 1930; Woodford, 
2003). 
Armando’s treatment of  such queries makes the case for the policy space 
on hand to postpone the litoff  decision until monetary accommodation will 
no longer be needed (about 2019, according to his econometric projections). 
What is also out of  the question is that the day of  reckoning, as it were, will 
come sooner or later, and the litoff  shall take place in the realm of  a quite 
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substantial stock of  excess reserves in the hands of  the financial sector3. Yet, 
the paper under consideration bypasses another puzzling key aspect of  the 
transition to normalcy, i.e., the reduction of  the Fed’s balance sheet to a range 
commensurate with, say, that of  the pre-Great Recession balance sheet size, and 
this is a not too easy trouble to deal with. For such a reduction will be slow 
and protracted; and what is more, given that the Fed’s accommodative stance 
has to bear with long-term problems such as risks of  financial instability, secular 
stagnation, slow productivity growth, “savings glut”, debt overhangs and the 
like, the liftoff  decision ―occurring along with or without a balance sheet re-
duction― involves costs. But the no-liftoff  option is not cost-free either: for 
instance, the ZIRP seems to hamper arbitrage in the federal funds market, and 
the costs a substantial balance sheet involves hinder interest rate margins (Wil-
liamson, 2015). Therefore, and to wrap up, whatever decision is to be taken on 
the best timing for a liftoff  should also include a hint of  the best way for the 
Fed to exit QE in its path to normalcy. 
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Respuesta a los comentarios de Jessica Roldán Peña, 
Julio A. Carrillo y Rocío Elizondo sobre el documento:
 “Should the U.S. Federal Reserve increase the federal funds 
rate in 2016? An assessment based on the neutral interest rate”
Se agradecen los valiosos comentarios de Jessica Roldán Peña, Julio A. Carrillo 
y Rocío Elizondo. Sin duda sus aportaciones han contribuido a clarificar el aná- 
lisis y la aplicación de la metodología propuesta. En lo que sigue, hemos dividido 
las respuestas a sus comentarios en dos secciones. En la primera se responden las 
observaciones técnicas sobre la metodología CVAR para la estimación de la tasa de 
interés neutral. En la segunda se abordan los comentarios sobre la aplicación 
de la metodología para el caso específico de la economía norteamericana.
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CќњђћѡюџіќѠ Ѡќяџђ љюѠ џђѐќњђћёюѐіќћђѠ
ѝюџю ђљ ђїђџѐіѐіќ ђѐќћќњѼѡџіѐќ
La estimación del modelo CVAR utiliza las variables descritas en la regla de Ta-
ylor, en la ecuación [1] del documento original, pero la prueba de cointegración 
arroja la existencia de cuatro relaciones de cointegración porque se descom-
ponen las brechas del producto y de la inflación en sus componentes, es decir 
en el PIB real y potencial, y en la inflación observada y la meta de inflación de la 
Reserva Federal. Como el objetivo del artículo es determinar una ecuación de 
la tasa de interés de corto plazo, sólo se lleva a cabo el proceso de identificación 
econométrica de dicho vector de cointegración. Sin embargo, como lo afirman 
los comentaristas, es completamente posible identificar una ecuación de pro-
ducto, de inflación o alguna otra de acuerdo a la teoría económica. Sin duda, una 
completa identificación del espacio de cointegración del CVAR podría ofrecer 
una mayor precisión estadística. Este objetivo nos permitimos plantearlo 
como una tarea para futuras investigaciones sobre el tema. 
Cabe destacar que la tasa de inflación en el CVAR es la tasa de crecimiento 
del índice de precios de los gastos de consumo personal excluyendo alimentos 
y energía, que es la misma que utilizan Laubach y Williams (2003) en el artículo 
donde estiman la tasa de interés neutral para Estados Unidos. Los métodos utili-
zados para estimar los valores históricos del producto potencial y la inflación de 
largo plazo son el filtro de Hodrick-Prescott y un modelo AR(4) respectivamente, 
lo que es muy común en la literatura previa. 
Para verificar la robustez de nuestras estimaciones se estimó el mismo modelo 
CVAR pero usando el PIB potencial reportado por el CBO y la inflación tendencial 
que resulta de un VAR bayesiano (Primiceri, 2005). Específicamente, se utilizó 
un VAR conocido como Time Varying Structural Vector Autoregressions (TVP-VAR) con 
volatilidad estocástica para estimar la inflación de equilibrio. A continuación se 
comparan dichas variables con las del modelo original (véanse las gráficas 1 y 2).
En principio, las series estimadas para la inflación de equilibrio con el TPV-
VAR es bastante similar a la estimada con un modelo AR(4) como lo muestra la 
gráfica 1. Cabe destacar que la serie que tiene una mayor discrepancia cuando 
se usan diferentes métodos (Hodrick-Prescott versus CBO) es la del PIB potencial. 
No obstante, las tendencias de las series con diferentes métodos son bastantes 
similares, lo que nos lleva a pensar que no debería haber cambios muy drásticos 
en las estimaciones del nuevo CVAR.
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Gráfica 1
Comparación de la inflación de equilibrio 

















































































































Inflación de equilibrio AR(4) Inflación de equilibrio TVP-VAR
Fuente: elaboración propia con datos de la FRED Economic Data, Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis. Disponible a través de: <hĴps://research.stlouisfed.org/>.
Gráfica 2









































































































PIB potencial HP PIB potencial CBO 
Fuente: elaboración propia con datos de la FRED Economic Data, Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, disponible a través de: <hĴps://research.stlouisfed.org/>, y del 
Congressional Budget Oﬃce, disponible a través de: <hĴps://www.cbo.gov/>.
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Para verificar lo anterior, se estimó y proyectó la tasa de interés neutral si-
guiendo exactamente la misma metodología propuesta en el artículo pero usando 
el PIB potencial del CBO y la inflación de equilibrio del TVP-VAR. Los resultados de 
las proyecciones se reportan en el cuadro 1. 
Cuadro 1
Tasa de interés neutral ( rt
* ) a través de diferentes métodos
Promedio





















2016 0.564 1.048 –0.899 –0.545
2017 1.199 1.176 –0.287 –0.442
2018 1.653 1.290 0.054 –0.353
2019 1.964 1.397 0.294 –0.275
2020 2.106 1.500 0.361 –0.199
2021 2.124 1.597 0.341 –0.130
Notas: Columnas 2 y 4: el producto potencial se estimó usando el filtro Hodrick-PrescoĴ y 
la inflación mediante un modelo AR(4). Columnas 3 y 5: el producto potencial corresponde 
a la estimación de la ѐяќ y la inflación se estimó usando un modelo ѡѣѝ-ѣюџ.
Los resultados de las columnas 3 y 5 son bastante similares a los de las columnas 
2 y 4; solamente se observan cambios no muy grandes en magnitud, pero no en 
la dirección, lo que sugiere que hay evidencia de robustez no sólo ante cambios 
en las variables utilizadas, sino también ante cambios en los métodos de esti-
mación de las variables no observables. Cabe destacar que habría que probar 
otros métodos y variables alternativas para aumentar la certidumbre sobre la 
robustez de las estimaciones que ofrece nuestra metodología. 
Ahora bien, la estimación y proyección de la tasa neutral, como bien lo su-
gieren los comentaristas, es un ejercicio sujeto a una gran incertidumbre porque, 
por ejemplo, para estimar la brecha de producto se requiere una estimación del 
producto potencial que no es observable. Esto es, las estimaciones dependen de 
la precisión de los pronósticos de las brechas de producto y de inflación. Así, 
los resultados siempre estarán sujetos a los supuestos sobre los fundamentos y 
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la evolución futura de la economía norteamericana. Por ello, para dimensionar 
adecuadamente la posible utilidad de nuestra metodología y la veracidad de sus 
resultados es importante aclarar que los pronósticos de la tasa neutral se reali- 
zaron tomando como base los pronósticos dinámicos del propio CVAR. Esto 
es, los insumos externos (inflación de equilibrio y PIB potencial) sólo se usaron 
para la parte histórica de la base de datos, y los pronósticos de la tasa neutral se 
realizaron tomando como base los pronósticos dinámicos del propio CVAR. Por 
lo tanto, una correcta especificación del CVAR es de crucial importancia en esta 
metodología. Es importante mencionar que también se podría incluir insumos 
externos de los pronósticos de las brechas y comparar resultados. 
Con la finalidad de ofrecer más certidumbre a los lectores sobre nuestros 
resultados, a continuación se contrastan las trayectorias futuras de la tasa de creci- 
miento del PIB real, del PIB potencial y de la inflación que se derivan del CVAR con 
los pronósticos para las mismas variables publicados por la Reserva Federal y 
el CBO. 
Cuadro 2
Pronósticos del ѝія y de la inflación subyacente 




del ѝія potencial 
proyectada
Inflación subyacente 
de gastos del consumidor 
proyectada
 (Core ѝѐђ inflation)
 (ѐѣюџ)  (ѓџя)*   (ѐѣюџ)  (ѐяќ)  (ѐѣюџ) (ѓџя)*
2016 2.1 2.1-2.3  2.0 1.5  1.4 1.4-1.7
2017 2.2 2.0-2.3  1.9 1.7  1.5 1.7-2.0
2018 2.0 1.8-2.1  1.7 1.8  1.6 1.9-2.0
Notas: ѓџя = Federal Reserve Board. */ Pronósticos de tendencia central. 
Fuente: Federal Reserve Board y modelo ѐѣюџ.
Las cifras del cuadro 2 sugieren que existe cierta similitud entre los pronósticos 
de las variables no observables del CVAR con los de la Reserva Federal y el CBO. 
No parece haber enormes discrepancias ni en las proyecciones de los insumos 
externos ni en los resultados derivados de nuestro método de análisis en el cuadro 
2. Así, se confirma que los supuestos sobre las variables a futuro no son extre-
madamente diferentes a los utilizados por la Reserva Federal y los del CBO.
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RђѐќњђћёюѐіќћђѠ ѝюџю љю іћѡђџѝџђѡюѐіңћ
ёђ љќѠ џђѠѢљѡюёќѠ
En esta sección coincidimos con los comentaristas en que no se puede identificar 
la postura de política monetaria a través del nivel de la tasa neutral o de la tasa 
de referencia en aislamiento; se necesita de ambas tasas. En este caso, para juz-
gar si la política monetaria debería ser expansiva o restrictiva en el futuro, sería 
necesario evaluar la diferencia entre la tasa de interés de referencia pronosticada 
(una meta proyectada por el banco en el futuro) respecto al nivel pronosticado 
de la tasa neutral. En el cuadro 3 comparamos la trayectoria futura de la tasa de 
Fondos Federales según las proyecciones de la Reserva Federal (2016-208) con 
la trayectoria futura de la tasa neutral estimada mediante el modelo CVAR:
Cuadro 3
Comparación de la trayectoria futura 
de tasa de Fondos Federales de la Reserva Federal 
con la trayectoria futura de la tasa neutral del modelo ѐѣюџ









e*  P 1
(ѐѣюџ)
Proyección de la tasa real 




2016 0.564 0.900 –0.899 –0.563
2017 1.199 1.900 –0.287 0.413
2018 1.653 3.000 0.054 1.400
2019 1.964 n.d. 0.294 n.d.
2020 2.106 n.d. 0.361 n.d.
2021 2.124 n.d. 0.341 n.d.
Nota: n.d. = no disponible. */ Pronósticos medios.
Fuente: elaboración propia con base en datos de la Federal Open Market CommiĴee’s 
(ѓќњѐ). Disponible a través de: <hĴps://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
fomcprojtabl20160316.htm>.
Estas cifras sugieren que la posición de política monetaria que implican las pro-
yecciones de la tasa de corto plazo de la Reserva Federal seria restrictiva si las 
comparamos con las tasas neutrales derivadas del CVAR. Cabe mencionar que 
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la anterior conclusión puede cambiar si comparamos contra tasas neutrales de 
un modelo de otra naturaleza. 
Por ejemplo, en 2018 la Reserva Federal espera una tasa de interés objetivo 
de alrededor de 3 cuando nuestro modelo sugiere que debe ser de alrededor de 
1.65. En consecuencia, con base en nuestras proyecciones de la tasa neutral y 
comparadas con las previsiones de la tasa de fondos federales de la Reserva 
Federal podríamos sugerir que la postura de política de ésta debería mantenerse 
mucho más moderada y que hay espacio para una política monetaria acomodaticia 
por al menos tres años más. 
Como bien nos hacen notar nuestros comentaristas, si asumimos que nuestra 
metodología basada en el CVAR es robusta estadísticamente hablando, entonces 
el cuadro anterior ofrece cierta evidencia de que la política monetaria que podría 
seguir la Reserva Federal sería contractiva en los años venideros y que, aunque 
la tasa neutral muestra señales de recuperación, no alcanzaría a crecer más 
rápidamente que las proyecciones de la de corto plazo que publica en su pros-
pectiva oficial. Así, la economía estadounidense experimentaría costos debido 
a una postura monetaria restrictiva. Si nuestras estimaciones son apropiadas, la 
orientación de la política monetaria debería ser aún más acomodaticia de lo que 
sugieren sus prospectivas. 
Finalmente, se considera que la referencia a Clarida (2015), sobre la previ-
sión de que la Reserva Federal iniciará un programa de contracción monetaria 
agresiva una vez que la economía alcance la NAIRU, fue una cita colocada en un 
lugar inapropiado.
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Aћђѥќ 1
Cuadro A1
Fuente estadística de los datos
Nombre de la variable Unidades Fuente
ѝія real Billones de dólaresencadenados a 2009 = 100 FRED
ѝія real potencial ѐяќ Billones de dólaresencadenados a 2009 = 100 FRED
ѝія potencial con filtro 
Hodrick-PrescoĴ
Billones de dólares
encadenados a 2009 = 100
Elaboración propia 
con datos de la FRED
Tasa de interés de Fondos 
Federales efectiva Porcentaje FRED
Índice de gastos del consumidor 
excluyendo alimentos y energía Porcentaje, 2009 = 100 FRED
Fuente: elaboración propia con datos de la FRED Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis. Disponible a través de: <hĴps://research.stlouisfed.org/>.
A comment on Ignacio Perrotini’s contribution: The Fed’s path 
to normalcy and the puzzling natural rate of interest
I really appreciate Ignacio Perrotini’s comments. His main contribution em-
phasizes on new theoretical issues about the neutral rate and their links to the 
current policy stance in the United States. These issues belong to a Wicksellian 
tradition dealing with the influence of  the rate of  interest on prices and business 
fluctuations. Such discussion is definitively an unavoidable task to face in the field 
of  monetary theory nowadays. In this brief  response I just want to emphasize 
that our empirical work might provide some insights on such issues and we plan 
to work on some those theoretical aspects in the very near future.
